Research
In this section you will find a reading list encompassing a wide range of studies, articles and reports relating to the spread of pro-Kremlin disinformation.
Whether you want a general introduction, to learn about the Kremlin’s attempts to influence elections, or investigate how one single false message gets spread via a wide network of websites – this is the place to start.
The Research page is available in English only
How we collect the material
The selection of works keeps a balance between academic depth and reputability, but also a breadth of perspectives and interests beyond the academy. We have established quality control measures and the material selection was based on the five issue areas below.
This area is dedicated to the activities of major threat actors, namely Russia and China and their aims, motives and capacities.
This area captures the methods and tools deployed by threat actors to manipulate information: social media, narratives, emerging tech etc.
This area focuses on the socio-political areas targeted by threat actors: social cohesion, political processes, health, security and foreign policy.
This issue area centres on the effects of FIMI (foreign information manipulations and interference) in terms of outcomes: cognitive impacts, social and political division, soft power projection etc.
This area classifies the types of responses to FIMI (foreign information manipulations and interference) by a range of stakeholders: regulatory, proactive and self-regulatory, reactive responses and policy recommendations.
Filters
An article proposing the concept of a “connective strategic narrative,” showing how grassroots Ukrainian social media users shaped a more effective and adaptive wartime narrative than Russia’s centralised, state-driven propaganda.
A study of how North Korea has developed one of the world’s most advanced and aggressive cyber warfare programs focused on financial theft, espionage and disruptive attacks, and which is now integrating AI.
This chapter presents a detailed framework for understanding information warfare as both an academic construct and a strategic tool, tracing its historical evolution, generational development and operational application across cognitive, psychological and sociopolitical domains.
A study on how China’s cognitive warfare campaign seeks to reshape Taiwanese public opinion and weaken US-Taiwan relations by manipulating narratives through media influence, economic pressure and strategic disinformation.
An article exploring how Chinese state media deploys selective framing in international broadcasts to present an idealised economic image of China, while omitting internal challenges, as part of broader public opinion warfare efforts.
An article examining how the Chinese Communist Party integrates political warfare, including public opinion, psychological, and legal tactics, into its strategy to isolate Taiwan, deter US intervention and shape the battlespace before any prospective conflict begins.
An article analysing how Russian state media used narrative strategies (suppression, destruction, direction and exploitation) to depict Sweden as unstable and responsible for regional insecurity following its NATO application.
An analysis of how China’s international state media frames positive narratives for foreign audiences, focusing on economic success while omitting domestic challenges.
A study comparing how Russians and Americans understand the Ukraine war, showing each public is more accurate about the opposing side’s narrative and biased toward their own; links findings to media systems and strategic information control.
An analysis of how Internet memes are deployed as tools of information warfare by autocracies and democracies, especially in the Russia–Ukraine conflict, using a large dataset of memes and discourse analysis to show how memes shape perceptions, polarise audiences, and exploit democratic openness.
A study of how Sputnik News framed the 2022 invasion of Ukraine in Czech, German, and English finding that core pro-Kremlin narratives were adapted to local contexts, showing deliberate tailoring in Russia’s information warfare strategy.
A study applying a deep learning model to classify sentiment in over 400,000 tweets about the Ukraine-Russia war, revealing shifts in public mood and dominant emotional themes.
An quantitative analysis of over 20 million tweets and 1 million Reddit comments during the Russia-Ukraine war, showing that bots dominated Twitter while Reddit was human driven. English content shaped discourse in Japanese and German, heightening toxicity and polarisation.
A revised report (republished in January 2025) analysing Kremlin’s information operations in five countries: Egypt, Mali, Kenya, South Africa, and the United Arab Emirates, providing insights into how Russia tailors its disinformation strategies beyond Western contexts.
A report exploring how adversaries like Russia, China, and Iran are refining their information tools and tactics to target individuals and exacerbate divisions within the United States — state by state — aiming to destabilise the country domestically and weaken its global standing.