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39 articles
Explosives and propaganda: Russia’s dual-use drones

Explosives and propaganda: Russia’s dual-use drones

Russian First Person View (FPV) drones have become a defining feature of the war in Ukraine. The same drones used to drop explosives on civilians and military targets are also being used to distribute propaganda leaflets in frontline communities, combining physical violence with psychological warfare.
The dog that didn’t bark: What the Danish election reveals about Russian influence operations

The dog that didn’t bark: What the Danish election reveals about Russian influence operations

According to Danish state authorities, there were no major foreign influence campaigns to speak of in the lead-up to Denmark’s March 2026 parliamentary election. Local fact-checkers and journalists tracked pro-Russian narratives and fringe propaganda channels, but nothing resembling a broad, coordinated campaign with significant reach emerged. Monitoring and analysis by Defense Innovation Highway and OpenMinds of part of the Danish online information environment during the campaign reached similar conclusions.
The Digital Iron Curtain 2.0: how the MAX messenger is reshaping Russia’s communication space

The Digital Iron Curtain 2.0: how the MAX messenger is reshaping Russia’s communication space

By 2026, Russia’s digital control strategy has evolved from blocking platforms like Telegram to building its own: MAX, a state-backed messenger with over 55 million users. More than an app, MAX integrates messaging, verified digital IDs, and state services—effectively embedding surveillance into daily life. Though not legally mandatory, schools and agencies now rely on it, making alternatives impractical. The Kremlin isn’t just censoring; it’s redesigning the digital environment to ensure compliance by default.
How Russia lies about the stolen Ukrainian children

How Russia lies about the stolen Ukrainian children

How the Kremlin uses disinformation to justify the unlawful deportation of Ukrainian children, deny war crimes, and manipulate international audiences while obstructing accountability and the children’s return.
Propaganda as a weapon system: how Russian propaganda shapes soldiers’ beliefs and combat motivation

Propaganda as a weapon system: how Russian propaganda shapes soldiers’ beliefs and combat motivation

Russian propaganda is a psychological weapon, not just rhetoric. A study of 1,060 Russian POWs found 77% believed Kremlin narratives, with 68% justifying the invasion. Soldiers indoctrinated by propaganda were six times more likely to support the war, twice as willing to re-enlist, and far more prone to dehumanising Ukrainians. Anti-Western myths—like "NATO is waging war through Ukraine"—were believed by 80%. This proves propaganda fuels aggression, demanding legal accountability as a tool of war.
How Russia weaponizes the church in Ukraine

How Russia weaponizes the church in Ukraine

One weapon in the hybrid arsenal Russia has deployed against Ukraine is the issue of religion. Russia has exploited the Orthodox Church to carry out various destructive actions on the ground, including through Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) campaigns.
A Historian’s Big Picture. Russia’s war against Ukraine and how to end it in a right way

A Historian’s Big Picture. Russia’s war against Ukraine and how to end it in a right way

Ukraine represents a decisive fork in Europe’s future. A Ukraine absorbed by empire would empower a fundamentally different, and far more dangerous, Russia. A Ukraine integrated into Europe strengthens the post-imperial alternative that the EU embodies. That outcome will not be achieved by abstract appeals to peace. It requires recognising imperial dynamics, dismantling myths of inevitability, confronting economic enablers of war, and accepting Europe’s own agency in history. In that sense, the war is not only about Ukraine. It is about whether Europe understands what it is – and what it stands against.
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Cases in the EUvsDisinfo database focus on messages in the international information space that are identified as providing a partial, distorted, or false depiction of reality and spread key pro-Kremlin messages. This does not necessarily imply, however, that a given outlet is linked to the Kremlin or editorially pro-Kremlin, or that it has intentionally sought to disinform. EUvsDisinfo publications do not represent an official EU position, as the information and opinions expressed are based on media reporting and analysis of the East Stratcom Task Force.

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