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La selezione dei lavori mantiene un equilibrio tra spessore accademico e rispettabilità, ma anche un’ampiezza di prospettive e interessi oltre l’ambito accademico. Abbiamo delineato dei criteri per il controllo della qualità e la selezione del materiale è stata basata sulle cinque sezioni qui di seguito.
questa sezione è dedicata alle attività dei principali autori delle minacce, e cioè Russia e Cina, e ai loro obiettivi, motivazioni e capacità.
questa sezione è dedicata ai metodi e agli strumenti impiegati dagli autori delle minacce per manipolare le informazioni: social media, storie, tecnologie emergenti, ecc.
questa sezione si occupa delle aree socio-politiche prese di mira dagli autori delle minacce: coesione sociale, prassi politiche, salute, sicurezza e politica estera.
questa sezione è incentrata sugli effetti della manipolazione delle informazioni e ingerenze da parte di attori stranieri (FIMI, foreign information manipulations and interference) in termini di esiti: impatti cognitivi, divisione sociale e politica, proiezione del potere di persuasione, ecc.
questa sezione classifica i tipi di risposte alla manipolazione delle informazioni e ingerenze da parte di attori stranieri (FIMI, foreign information manipulations and interference) da parte di una serie di soggetti interessati: risposte normative, proattive e di autoregolamentazione, reattive e raccomandazioni politiche.
Filtri
An article proposing the concept of a “connective strategic narrative,” showing how grassroots Ukrainian social media users shaped a more effective and adaptive wartime narrative than Russia’s centralised, state-driven propaganda.
A study of how North Korea has developed one of the world’s most advanced and aggressive cyber warfare programs focused on financial theft, espionage and disruptive attacks, and which is now integrating AI.
This chapter presents a detailed framework for understanding information warfare as both an academic construct and a strategic tool, tracing its historical evolution, generational development and operational application across cognitive, psychological and sociopolitical domains.
A study on how China’s cognitive warfare campaign seeks to reshape Taiwanese public opinion and weaken US-Taiwan relations by manipulating narratives through media influence, economic pressure and strategic disinformation.
An article exploring how Chinese state media deploys selective framing in international broadcasts to present an idealised economic image of China, while omitting internal challenges, as part of broader public opinion warfare efforts.
An article examining how the Chinese Communist Party integrates political warfare, including public opinion, psychological, and legal tactics, into its strategy to isolate Taiwan, deter US intervention and shape the battlespace before any prospective conflict begins.
An article analysing how Russian state media used narrative strategies (suppression, destruction, direction and exploitation) to depict Sweden as unstable and responsible for regional insecurity following its NATO application.
An analysis of how China’s international state media frames positive narratives for foreign audiences, focusing on economic success while omitting domestic challenges.
A study comparing how Russians and Americans understand the Ukraine war, showing each public is more accurate about the opposing side’s narrative and biased toward their own; links findings to media systems and strategic information control.
An analysis of how Internet memes are deployed as tools of information warfare by autocracies and democracies, especially in the Russia–Ukraine conflict, using a large dataset of memes and discourse analysis to show how memes shape perceptions, polarise audiences, and exploit democratic openness.
A study of how Sputnik News framed the 2022 invasion of Ukraine in Czech, German, and English finding that core pro-Kremlin narratives were adapted to local contexts, showing deliberate tailoring in Russia’s information warfare strategy.
A study applying a deep learning model to classify sentiment in over 400,000 tweets about the Ukraine-Russia war, revealing shifts in public mood and dominant emotional themes.
An quantitative analysis of over 20 million tweets and 1 million Reddit comments during the Russia-Ukraine war, showing that bots dominated Twitter while Reddit was human driven. English content shaped discourse in Japanese and German, heightening toxicity and polarisation.
A revised report (republished in January 2025) analysing Kremlin’s information operations in five countries: Egypt, Mali, Kenya, South Africa, and the United Arab Emirates, providing insights into how Russia tailors its disinformation strategies beyond Western contexts.
A report exploring how adversaries like Russia, China, and Iran are refining their information tools and tactics to target individuals and exacerbate divisions within the United States — state by state — aiming to destabilise the country domestically and weaken its global standing.