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Come raccogliamo il materiale

La selezione dei lavori mantiene un equilibrio tra spessore accademico e rispettabilità, ma anche un’ampiezza di prospettive e interessi oltre l’ambito accademico. Abbiamo delineato dei criteri per il controllo della qualità e la selezione del materiale è stata basata sulle cinque sezioni qui di seguito.

Issue area 1
Autori delle minacce:

questa sezione è dedicata alle attività dei principali autori delle minacce, e cioè Russia e Cina, e ai loro obiettivi, motivazioni e capacità.

Issue area 2
Metodi e strumenti:

questa sezione è dedicata ai metodi e agli strumenti impiegati dagli autori delle minacce per manipolare le informazioni: social media, storie, tecnologie emergenti, ecc.

Issue area 3
Aree di ingerenza:

questa sezione si occupa delle aree socio-politiche prese di mira dagli autori delle minacce: coesione sociale, prassi politiche, salute, sicurezza e politica estera.

Issue area 4
Impatti:

questa sezione è incentrata sugli effetti della manipolazione delle informazioni e ingerenze da parte di attori stranieri (FIMI, foreign information manipulations and interference) in termini di esiti: impatti cognitivi, divisione sociale e politica, proiezione del potere di persuasione, ecc.

Issue area 5
Risposte:

questa sezione classifica i tipi di risposte alla manipolazione delle informazioni e ingerenze da parte di attori stranieri (FIMI, foreign information manipulations and interference) da parte di una serie di soggetti interessati: risposte normative, proattive e di autoregolamentazione, reattive e raccomandazioni politiche.

Filtri

Autori delle minacce:
Metodi e strumenti:
Aree di ingerenza:
Impatti:
Risposte:
215 risultati
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2025 | Frontiers in Political Science | Article
Advantages of the Connective Strategic Narrative during the Russian–Ukrainian War
Di: Zakharchenko, Artem
Vedi sommario

An article proposing the concept of a “connective strategic narrative,” showing how grassroots Ukrainian social media users shaped a more effective and adaptive wartime narrative than Russia’s centralised, state-driven propaganda.

2025 | Journal of Information Warfare | Article
A Study of North Korea’s Cyber Warfare: Actors, Tactics, and Integration
Di: Easttom, Chuck
Vedi sommario

A study of how North Korea has developed one of the world’s most advanced and aggressive cyber warfare programs focused on financial theft, espionage and disruptive attacks, and which is now integrating AI.

2025 | The Handbook of Social and Political Conflict (edited by Sergei A. Samoilenko, Solon Simmons) | Chapter
Information Warfare as a Theoretical Construct and an Operational Practice
Di: Simons, Greg; Iulian Chifu
Vedi sommario

This chapter presents a detailed framework for understanding information warfare as both an academic construct and a strategic tool, tracing its historical evolution, generational development and operational application across cognitive, psychological and sociopolitical domains.

2025 | Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs | Article
The Challenges Taiwan Faces in Cognitive Warfare and Its Impact on US-Taiwan Relations
Di: Chen, Jeremy (Yen-ming)
Vedi sommario

A study on how China’s cognitive warfare campaign seeks to reshape Taiwanese public opinion and weaken US-Taiwan relations by manipulating narratives through media influence, economic pressure and strategic disinformation.

2025 | Journal of Information Warfare | Article
Everything Is Awesome! Chinese Propaganda Framing about China
Di: Wilbur, Douglas S.
Vedi sommario

An article exploring how Chinese state media deploys selective framing in international broadcasts to present an idealised economic image of China, while omitting internal challenges, as part of broader public opinion warfare efforts.

2025 | Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs | Article
National Chengchi University (Taipei); Thammasat University (Bangkok)
Di: Gershaneck, Kerry K.; Eric Chan
Vedi sommario

An article examining how the Chinese Communist Party integrates political warfare, including public opinion, psychological, and legal tactics, into its strategy to isolate Taiwan, deter US intervention and shape the battlespace before any prospective conflict begins.

2025 | Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies | Article
Storying Strategies in Russian Information Warfare Against Sweden: The Post-Ukraine War Narratives
Di: Lanevik, Lisa; Imoh Antai
Vedi sommario

An article analysing how Russian state media used narrative strategies (suppression, destruction, direction and exploitation) to depict Sweden as unstable and responsible for regional insecurity following its NATO application.

2025 | Journal of Information Warfare | Article
Everything Is Awesome! Chinese Propaganda Framing about China
Di: Wilbur, Douglas S.
Vedi sommario

An analysis of how China’s international state media frames positive narratives for foreign audiences, focusing on economic success while omitting domestic challenges.

2025 | Political Psychology | Article
Understanding the War in Ukraine: Comparing Knowledge and Bias in Russia and the U.S.
Di: Beattie, Peter; Elena Sherstoboeva
Vedi sommario

A study comparing how Russians and Americans understand the Ukraine war, showing each public is more accurate about the opposing side’s narrative and biased toward their own; links findings to media systems and strategic information control.

2025 | Social Sciences and Humanities Open | Article
Memes, Freedom, and Resilience to Information Disorders: Information Warfare between Democracies and Autocracies
Di: Liagusha, Anton; Dmytro Iarovyi
Vedi sommario

An analysis of how Internet memes are deployed as tools of information warfare by autocracies and democracies, especially in the Russia–Ukraine conflict, using a large dataset of memes and discourse analysis to show how memes shape perceptions, polarise audiences, and exploit democratic openness.

2025 | Nationalities Papers (Cambride University Press) | Article
Tailoring Narratives on War in Ukraine: Cross-national Study of Sputnik News
Di: Burda, Robin; Veronika Bundzíková
Vedi sommario

A study of how Sputnik News framed the 2022 invasion of Ukraine in Czech, German, and English finding that core pro-Kremlin narratives were adapted to local contexts, showing deliberate tailoring in Russia’s information warfare strategy.

2025 | International Journal of Information Technology | Article
A Sentiment Analysis of the Ukraine-Russia War Tweets Using Knowledge Graph Convolutional Networks
Di: Menaouer, Brahami; Safa Fairouz; Mohammed Boulekbachi Meriem; Sabri Mohammed; Matta Nada
Vedi sommario

A study applying a deep learning model to classify sentiment in over 400,000 tweets about the Ukraine-Russia war, revealing shifts in public mood and dominant emotional themes.

2025 | European Physical Journal | Article
Social Media Warfare: Investigating Human-Bot Engagement in English, Japanese and German during the Russo-Ukrainian War on Twitter and Reddit
Di: Xu, Wentao; Kazutoshi Sasahara; Jianxun Chu; Bin Wang; Wenlu Fan; Zhiwen Hu
Vedi sommario

An quantitative analysis of over 20 million tweets and 1 million Reddit comments during the Russia-Ukraine war, showing that bots dominated Twitter while Reddit was human driven. English content shaped discourse in Japanese and German, heightening toxicity and polarisation.

2025 | NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence | Report
Russian Information Operations Outside of the Western Information Environment (Revised version; republished January 2025)
Di: Morley-Davies, Jonathan; Jem Thomas; Graham Baines
Vedi sommario

A revised report (republished in January 2025) analysing Kremlin’s information operations in five countries: Egypt, Mali, Kenya, South Africa, and the United Arab Emirates, providing insights into how Russia tailors its disinformation strategies beyond Western contexts.

2025 | German Martshall Fund of the United States | Report
The State(s) of Foreign Information Operations
Di: Sikora, Krystyna; Bret Schafer
Vedi sommario

A report exploring how adversaries like Russia, China, and Iran are refining their information tools and tactics to target individuals and exacerbate divisions within the United States — state by state — aiming to destabilise the country domestically and weaken its global standing.

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CLAUSOLA DI ESCLUSIONE DELLA RESPONSABILITÀ

I casi presenti nella banca dati di EUvsDisinfo si concentrano sui messaggi nello spazio informativo internazionale nei quali è stata individuata una rappresentazione parziale, distorta o falsa della realtà, nonché la diffusione di messaggi pro-Cremlino. Ciò non implica necessariamente che un determinato canale sia collegato al Cremlino o sia editorialmente pro-Cremlino, oppure che abbia intenzionalmente cercato di disinformare. Le pubblicazioni di EUvsDisinfo non rappresentano la posizione ufficiale dell’UE, poiché le informazioni e le opinioni espresse si basano sui resoconti dei media e sull’analisi della task force East Stratcom.

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