Why the information space has become a minefield for EU CSDP missions and operations
When Armenian voters renewed Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s mandate in the June 2026 parliamentary elections, they did more than choose a government. They chose closer cooperation with the European Union. That choice made them a target.
As Armenia deepened its relations with the EU, it became a frequent target of Russian Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI). Attempts to discredit European engagements are a recurring feature relayed across social media platforms, inauthentic news websites, and foreign state-controlled outlets. FIMI has specifically targeted the EU mission in Armenia (EUMA), which was established in 2023 to monitor and support confidence-building in conflict-affected areas in the country. This pattern is telling: modern influence operations do not happen only during war time. They seek to divide partners, distort facts, shape people’s minds, manipulate their emotions, and influence their decisions.
This is why, on 13 July 2026, the EU, at the request of Armenian authorities, launched a second mission in Armenia – the EU Partnership Mission (EUPM Armenia). It recognises a new reality confronting not only the Armenian people, but the EU and its partners worldwide – foreign influence operations don’t just distort information – they corrode democratic development, divide societies, and prey on the minds of the people they target. This is why the new EU mission is mandated to enhance the country’s resilience against FIMI but also cyberattacks and illicit financial flows. In today’s geopolitical environment, defending security increasingly means defending the information space.
The bigger FIMI picture
Yet Armenia is only part of a much wider story. From Ukraine and Moldova to the Red Sea, the Sahel, and beyond, hostile FIMI actors are increasingly targeting EU missions and operations in a coordinated and often inauthentic manner. These campaigns aim not only to weaken local support for EU engagement, but also to create political conditions favourable to external actors. Their objective is clear – to undermine the credibility of the Union and the confidence in its partnerships and security commitments. The battlefields may differ, but the patterns are largely consistent.
Whether targeting Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions in Armenia, the EU’s maritime operations in the Middle East and North Africa, or the EU’s , information manipulation has become a force multiplier for geopolitical competition. In this rivalry, the stakes for the EU are high. When left unaddressed, it can directly affect mission legitimacy, host nation consent, and population support.
New tools for new threats
Recognising this evolving threat, the EU has significantly strengthened its efforts to equip CSDP missions and operations to counter threats in the information space. Throughout 2024 and 2025, the European External Action Service expanded its analytical capabilities, enhanced its operational coordination, and delivered specialised training across the CSDP network. Eighty-six dedicated training activities, a detection and analysis methodology, and the development of the first-ever Counter-FIMI Handbook for CSDP missions have helped establish a common approach to identifying, analysing, and responding to information threats.
This work reflects a broader transformation in how the European Union approaches security. Protecting information integrity is no longer a supporting function of communications. It has become a prerequisite for the missions’ success. Protecting the credibility of EU engagement, building and safeguarding trust with local populations, and strengthening partner resilience are now as important as protecting physical assets on the ground. Information awareness and resilience building must therefore be embedded into mission planning from the outset rather than added reactively during a crisis.
One victory, but a long road ahead
The launch of EUPM Armenia is more than a success story for the EU and Armenia partnership. It is a powerful reminder that in an era of strategic competition, the ability to defend facts and democratic choices has become an essential component of peace and security. As adversaries continue to weaponise information, strengthening resilience against FIMI will remain critical to ensuring that EU missions and operations can deliver on their objectives and uphold the Union’s role as a credible and trusted global security actor. Protecting the information space is therefore no longer adjacent to security policy. It is now a pillar of national resilience.
